Boeing needed a plan B to save 787
Too complicated and too expensive to manufacture. Boeing does not veil the face. The B787 Dreamliner, the first of which came with three years late to All Nippon Airways (ANA) in late September 2011, a program remains at risk and lost.
The device, which has passed through many vicissitudes since its launch, has new technical problems. A "calibration problem between structural elements" of the rear fuselage was discovered during tests carried out in factories in Seattle. Jim Albaugh, president of Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA), admitted that the first 55 Dreamliners already built might be affected by this defect. The Boeing launched an inspection campaign and hopes to address this problem in the "ten to fifteen days." Meanwhile, industrial production ramp-up "is difficult," notes one observer. Boeing has delivered five devices from late September to ANA. Under these conditions, managing to deliver fifteen more by the end of March, as the company hoped the Japanese, is an impossible mission.
Suddenly, the group announced last weekend a radical decision afresh at the industrialization of the B 787 and review its relations with its 50 partners from rank 1 to the successful ramp-up and exit the program losses .
Permutation of managers
"There is no magic formula to improve productivity on these planes. That will come from simplification of production, employment under companions and a review of the supply chain, partner by partner, "said Pat Shanahan, general manager of the development of BCA paydayloan. Boeing is a savings of $ 1 billion. It has not been more forthcoming about how to allocate effort productivity, nor on the calendar.
He specified, however, that the boss of the program changed. Scott Fancher, who arrived in 2008 to replace the B787 on track, gives way to Larry Loftis, the boss of Boeing 777 it replaces. The switch should allow Boeing to better prepare its "organization for the challenges ahead," said Jim Albaugh. Larry Loftis brings experience in production (lean manufacturing) tested on a mature program, and Scott Fencher, its achievements in the management of a new generation aircraft with Boeing which has made several breaks.
Technology first with the massive use of composite materials (50% against 1% for the B 747). Then outsourcing industry with 70% of manufacturing with major partners in the U.S., Europe and Japan against 21% for the B 777 and 16% for the B 767. Taken to extremes, this model inspired by the automobile industry has shown its limits for a subject as complex as an airplane. Boeing has had to overcome the difficulties encountered by these partners.
For months, the group is considering the future of the Boeing 777 entered service in 1995. His successor, or a modernized 777 B that would heavily loaded with composites have much to learn from failures and successes of the B 787.